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Abstract
Background: Trade and health scholars have raised concern that international trade and particularly investment
disputes may be used by transnational health harmful commodity corporations (THCCs) to effectively generate
public health regulatory chill. The purpose of this study was to contribute to the limited evidence base of trade
or investment dispute-related regulatory chill using a case study of nutrition and alcohol policy in South Africa.
Methods: We conducted 35 semi-structured interviews with 36 key stakeholders involved in nutrition, alcohol and/
or trade/investment policymaking in South Africa. Interview transcripts were analyzed using thematic analysis. We
used Schram et al’s theory on three forms of regulatory chill (anticipatory, response and precedential) to guide the
analysis. We report evidence on each form of regulatory chill as well as specific contextual factors that may
influence the risk of regulatory chill.
Results: Trade obligations were found to generate a significantly greater anticipatory-type chilling effect on
nutrition and alcohol regulation than South Africa’s investment treaty obligations. Response chill was reported to
have occurred in relation to South Africa’s proposed tobacco plain packaging regulation while awaiting the
outcome of both Australia’s investor-state and WTO state-state disputes. No cases were reported of THCCs
threatening an investor-state dispute over nutrition or food regulations, but there were reported cases of THCCs
using arguments related to South Africa’s trade obligations to oppose policy action in these areas. No evidence of
nutrition or alcohol policy precedential chill were identified. Factors affecting the risk of policy chill include
legitimacy and perceived bias of the dispute system, costs involved in pursuing a regulation/defending a dispute
and capacity to pay, social acceptability of the industry, a product’s perceived risk to health and confidence in a
successful dispute outcome e.g. through cross-border policy learning.
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Conclusions: Our findings indicate that currently, South Africa’s trade obligations have a more prominent role in
inhibiting nutrition and alcohol action than investment treaty-related concerns. However, given the potential for
wider use of the ISDS mechanism by THCCs in the future, strategies to protect public health policy space in the
context of both international trade and investment treaty and dispute settlement contexts remain important.
Keywords: Policy chill, Regulatory chill, NCD prevention, Nutrition policy, Alcohol policy, Trade and investment
agreements
Background
An equitable approach to addressing the growing burden
of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) and their risk
factors in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs)
requires comprehensive population-level government in-
terventions [1, 2]. Ultra-processed foods and hazardous
alcohol use are two key areas for such regulation. Des-
pite increased attention to these issues globally, political
action to tackle food and alcohol environments has been
limited. Such inaction can be described as policy ‘non-
decision making’, encompassing deliberate decisions not
to act, involuntary failures to act as well as unconscious
inaction [3] by policymakers. As transnational ultra-
processed food and alcohol companies (referred to as
transnational health harmful commodity corporations or
THCCs hereafter) increasingly turn their attention to
LMIC markets for growth and profit [4–8], they are
likely to intensify their efforts to promote and support
non-decisions concerning nutrition and alcohol policy in
these countries.
Various industry tactics to promote nutrition and alco-
hol policy non-decisions have been documented globally
[7, 9–12]. However, the potential for THCCs to engage
in ‘venue-shifting’, a strategy to claim alternative spaces
of influence over policy decisions by shifting decision-
making power from democratically-elected governments
to other fora, including international trade and invest-
ment dispute settlement/arbitration venues, where their
interests may be more likely to be prioritized [13, 14],
has been relatively less well explored empirically. Al-
though THCCs cannot themselves informally challenge
or initiate a formal dispute at the World Trade
Organization (WTO), they can encourage and support
states to do so on their behalf [15]. For example, follow-
ing significant lobbying by tobacco corporations, in
2012, five LMIC member-states initiated a WTO dispute
against Australia for their proposed cigarette plain pack-
aging legislation [16, 17]. States though, may be deterred
from pursuing corporate interests in WTO fora due to
concerns of retaliatory measures in other areas and
norms of international diplomacy [18]. Even without
state support, THCCs themselves have used inter-
national trade-related legal threats in an effort to gener-
ate a chilling effect on NCD prevention policy. For
example, the alcohol industry threatened Thailand
would face a WTO dispute if it adopted a proposed ban
on alcohol advertising [19].
The investor-state dispute settlement mechanism
(ISDS) however, now included in over 2000 active bilat-
eral investment treaties (BITs) [20] as well as a number
of important regional trade and investment agreements,
provides a direct legal mechanism for corporations with
narrow financial interests (and few disincentives to avoid
spurious legal claims) to challenge domestic policies
using international agreements [18]. ISDS allows THCCs
to themselves bring claims for financial compensation
against states in private international tribunals when
they assess state action has compromised their invest-
ment [21]. To date, two of the most well-known
investor-state disputes relevant to public health have
been the cases of Philip Morris Asia vs Australia and
Phillip Morris International vs Uruguay for their tobacco
plain packaging and graphic warning labelling policies,
respectively [22, 23]. In both cases arbitrators ruled in
favour of the state, although in Australia this was on jur-
isdictional, not substantive grounds. Notably, given the
lack of precedent in investment arbitration, tobacco
companies may continue to threaten or pursue invest-
ment arbitration for similar regulations elsewhere [24].
Trade and health scholars have raised concern that
through active or threatened venue-shifting to investor-
state or WTO state-state dispute settlement, THCCs
may be effective in generating public health ‘regulatory
chill’ [25, 26], a specific kind of policy non-decision,
where a government delays, compromises, or abandons
the formulation or adoption of bone fide regulation in
the public interest to avoid a trade or investment dispute
[25, 27, 28]. Governments are incentivised to avoid a
trade dispute due to the substantial legal, administrative
and economic costs and the possible impact on future
trade negotiations [28, 29]. However, a real or perceived
threat of an investor-state dispute may be an especially
powerful driver of public health policy chill [18, 30] as
compared to a potential WTO dispute given the particu-
larly high financial cost of engaging in an investment
dispute [31]; potential award of financial compensation
to investors [32, 33]; vague and expansive nature of for-
eign investment protection provisions; unpredictability
of a dispute’s outcome; lack of appeal mechanism and
potential arbitrator conflict of interest. With limited
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financial and technical resources and potentially also
economic dependency on trade and investment from
wealthier countries, LMICs may be especially vulnerable
to regulatory chill [34].
In this paper, we explore and test three distinct forms
of trade or investment dispute-related regulatory chill,
similar to those described by Schram et al. (2018). Spe-
cific response chill refers to a chilling effect on a specific
proposed/adopted measure after a government becomes
aware of the threat of a potential dispute in relation to
such a regulation [25] which may be due to a dispute be-
ing pursued in another country. Anticipatory chill occurs
in situations where policymakers take into account po-
tential disputes during the policy development process,
hampering regulatory progress across a range of public
health policy areas [25]. Lastly, precedential chill is
where policymakers change or abandon a particular
regulation in response to a settled or resolved trade or
investment dispute due to concern of future disputes
based on the same regulation [25].
On reviewing the literature, we identified very few em-
pirical case studies broadly investigating investment
dispute-related regulatory chill, particularly in LMICs. A
Canadian case study by Côte (2014) including health
and safety and environmental regulators found little evi-
dence of investment dispute-related regulatory chill [35].
Côte also conducted in-depth interviews and surveys
with tobacco control regulators from 11 and 28 coun-
tries respectively, with similar findings. A separate, 2016
Canadian study by Van Harten and Scott, including in-
terviews with officials in ministries with an environmen-
tal or trade mandate in Ontario, concluded that the
Ministry of Health had changed its policy-making
process to account for the risk of a trade or investment
dispute including via adopting regulatory impact assess-
ments and legal vetting procedures [36]. A few studies
have also reported on specific cases of response chill.
For example, Curran and Eckhardt (2017) reported how
industry threats of investment arbitration using NAF-
TA’s Investment Chapter 11 heavily impacted the Can-
adian government’s decision to abandon their proposed
tobacco plain-packaging regulation in the 1990s [29].
Notably however, around two decades later, analyses ex-
plore how Australia and Uruguay avoided a chilling ef-
fect on tobacco control legislation despite threats and
eventual pursuit of investment arbitration by tobacco
corporations [16, 37].
Analysis of regulatory chill resulting from government
efforts to avoid a trade dispute is also relatively limited.
Some have shed light on why, despite eventual escalation
to formal WTO disputes, the governments of Australia
and Uruguay continued to pursue novel tobacco control
measures [38–40]. Other studies have focused on earlier
stages in the WTO complaint process by analyzing trade
challenges raised within the WTO’s Technical Barriers
to Trade (TBT) Committee meetings, to assess whether
WTO rules have been invoked in an effort to challenge
proposed health regulations [13, 41–44]. The largest of
these include two studies by Barlow and colleagues iden-
tifying that of all the challenges or trade concerns raised
by members at the WTO’s TBT Committee between
1995 and 2016, 250 concerned regulations aimed at pro-
tecting human health or safety [45], and of these 93 were
over food, beverage and tobacco regulations [28]. However,
very limited empirical analysis has been conducted to iden-
tify the extent to which such informal trade challenges or
formal WTO disputes generate a chilling effect on NCD pre-
vention policy action. The few studies we identified include
for example, Barlow and colleagues’ (2018) that reported four
case studies where informal trade challenges within the
WTO TBT Committee were associated with food or bever-
age policy change or delay [28].
The purpose of this study therefore is to contribute to
the particularly limited evidence base for trade or invest-
ment dispute-related regulatory chill using an in-depth
case study analysis of nutrition and alcohol policy non-
decisions in the LMIC country context of South Africa.
The aim was to understand to what extent trade or in-
vestment agreements/rules are used by industry or po-
tentially also economic policy actors as a tool to
promote nutrition and alcohol policy non-decisions; to
what extent, why and how the threat of an investor-state
dispute as compared to a state-state WTO dispute con-
tributes to public health regulatory chill; which types of
regulatory chill may be occurring; and to identify any
contextual factors, particularly relevant for LMICs, that
may be either protective or increase vulnerability to
regulatory chill.
Ethical approval for this work was obtained from the
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (28




South Africa, a middle-income country, was selected as
an appropriate single case study for a number of reasons
including its relatively high engagement in trade and in-
vestment agreements, previous exposure to trade and in-
vestment disputes and stated commitment to addressing
the rising burden of NCDs. These are outlined in detail
below as well as why they contributed to the selection of
South Africa as the case study for this work.
Trade and investment context
At the time of this study, South Africa was engaged in a
number of trade and investment agreements, exposing it
to threats of both WTO and ISDS arbitration. After
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Apartheid ended in 1994, South Africa rapidly entered
into a number of trade and investment agreements in
order to access foreign markets for South African goods
and promote foreign direct investment into the country.
In 1995 it became a member of the WTO, signed a Free
Trade Area with the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) in 1996, a further 22 bilateral in-
vestment agreements between 1997 and 2003 and a bi-
lateral trade agreement with the European Union (EU)
in 1999 [46].
Within this context, South Africa has been subject to
both trade and investment disputes. Since 1995 the
country has been the respondent in five WTO disputes
[47]. Additionally in 1997, forty pharmaceutical compan-
ies brought a domestic legal challenge against South Af-
rica claiming the country’s 1997 Medicines and Related
Substances Control Amendment Act that allowed the
use of parallel importation and compulsory licensing of
affordable generic medicines, was in violation of the
WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS) [48].
The risk of investment arbitration has also been within
the political consciousness in South Africa given the re-
cent ISDS cases against Australia and Uruguay for pro-
posed tobacco control regulations and South Africa’s
own previous exposure to two investment disputes
which (along with other cases globally) prompted a re-
view of all South Africa’s BITs in 2010. The review con-
cluded that South Africa’s ‘first generation’ BITs
contained significant ambiguity in the core legal provi-
sions protecting investor rights and potentially opened
the door for narrow foreign commercial interests to
challenge legitimate, constitutional, democratic public
policy in unpredictable international investor-state arbi-
tration [49]. Based on the review’s recommendations,
the South African government terminated a number of
existing BITs and instead sought to provide sufficient in-
vestment protection through a new Protection of Invest-
ment Act that came into effect in 2018 that confirmed
South Africa’s commitment to an open, transparent en-
vironment for foreign investment, attempted to secure a
balance of rights and obligations for all investors and
reaffirmed the government’s right to regulate in the pub-
lic interest [50].
Together with the other SADC countries, South Africa
has also participated in a new model BIT [49] that allows
South Africa to opt-out of ISDS in any future BITs, re-
quires investors to exhaust local remedies before pro-
ceeding to arbitration, and provides the basis for
government counterclaims and legal action against in-
vestors for treaty breaches [51]. Additionally in 2019,
South Africa made a submission to UNCITRAL discuss-
ing a range of possible reforms to the ISDS system in-
cluding to protect domestic policy space [52]. However,
at the time of this research, while South Africa has ter-
minated 12 BITs, it remained subject to potential
investor-state arbitration under 12 ongoing BITs to
which it was party, and under ‘survival’ clauses of termi-
nated agreements.
Nutrition and alcohol-related NCD prevention policy context
Given that NCDs now account for 51% of all deaths an-
nually [53] and alcohol-related harm remains persist-
ently high in South Africa [54], healthy diets and
reducing harmful alcohol consumption have become key
public health priorities. These are reflected in the Strat-
egy for the Prevention and Control of Obesity 2015–
2020 and Strategic Plan for the Prevention and Control
of NCDs 2013–17 [55, 56]. Although the South African
government has adopted a number of internationally
recommended policies for the prevention and control of
NCDs in the areas of nutrition and alcohol [57, 58],
there are a number of policies/regulations that have
been proposed but significantly delayed, drafted but not
progressed, or adopted but after significant delay and/or
re-formulated such that their effectiveness is reduced.
These policy non-decisions (outlined in Table 1) were
discussed during stakeholder interviews to explore
whether the risk of a trade and/or investment dispute
had influenced the policy process.
Additionally, given its geographical position, infra-
structure and relatively open economy, South Africa is a
strategic hub from which THCCs can develop new mar-
kets across Africa [7]. This combined with South Africa’s
status as a regional policy leader, may mean THCCs
have a particular interest in securing and maintaining a
favourable regulatory environment in South Africa to
prevent regional and continental policy transfer [59].
In summary, South Africa was selected as a useful case
study given the country’s exposure to international trade
and investment rules and dispute systems; political
awareness of trade and investment obligations and dis-
pute risk; recognition of unhealthy diets and alcohol-
related harm as public health problems requiring policy
action; and significant multinational food and alcohol
corporate presence in South Africa. These characteristics
allowed for analysis of if and how trade and/or invest-
ment rules/disputes threats may be used by external ac-
tors, particularly THCCs, to effectively generate NCD
prevention regulatory chill.
Data collection
We developed a semi-structured interview guide con-
taining questions to elicit key actors’ understanding and
experience of how South Africa’s international trade and
investment obligations might influence nutrition and al-
cohol harm reduction policy processes; and the strategic
approaches adopted by different stakeholders to achieve
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their desired trade/health objectives. The interview guide
was piloted with local experts within academia and gov-
ernment and adapted accordingly before use. An initial
stakeholder mapping was also undertaken to identify key
participants in the Department of Health (DoH), Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry (DTI), Department of Agri-
culture Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) as well as relevant
international organisations (IGOs)/non-government or-
ganisations (NGOs)/civil society organisations (CSOs),
industry and academia with experience or expert know-
ledge on nutrition and alcohol policy issues with poten-
tial relevance to international trade/investment; or trade
and investment policy development and negotiations.
Key stakeholders identified in the mapping process were
then invited to participate in an interview. Subsequently,
snow-ball sampling resulted in additional stakeholders
from within the Department of Social Development
(DSD); National Treasury and current and former
Health Attachés for South African Permanent Mission
to the United Nations Office in Geneva or South African
Embassy in Washington DC being invited to participate.
In total 74 stakeholders were contacted and invited to
take part in in a one-hour semi-structured interview.
Thirty-six agreed, 23 did not respond and 12 declined to
be interviewed (Table 2). While we attempted to recruit
government stakeholders in both senior technical and
more political roles, it was very challenging to recruit
the latter.
Between April 2019 and February 2020, 35 interviews
were conducted with 36 participants either in-person in
Cape Town/Pretoria or via phone/teleconference. Writ-
ten consent was obtained for all interviews. All govern-
ment participants were chief or deputy directors within
their respective departments with one deputy director
general. In this work, government stakeholders directly
involved in either agenda-setting or policy formulation
are referred to as ‘policymakers’, while stakeholders in
more political roles are referred to as government 'offi-
cials'. Industry representatives were governance and
regulatory experts, IGO, NGO and CSO representa-
tives had each been engaged in recent relevant nutri-
tion or alcohol policy processes in South Africa.
Where a stakeholder did not given permission to
identify their institutional affiliation, they are simply
referred to as a trade, health, or industry
‘stakeholder’.
A small number of DoH stakeholders interviewed were
in higher-level positions overseeing, or with broad know-
ledge of, multiple NCD policy areas and had an under-
standing of the risk of trade or investment disputes in
relation to tobacco control. A number of trade policy-
makers also had similar knowledge. As such, while the
focus of the research and interviews was on nutrition
and alcohol policy, tobacco control issues were also
raised by some interviewees and reported in the research
findings.
Table 1 Overview of alcohol and diet-related NCD prevention policy non-decisions in South Africa
Description of policy or regulation Status
Ban on marketing of unhealthy food and non-alcoholic beverages to all
school-aged children
Drafted in 2014, not progressed.
Mandatory front-of-pack nutrition labelling of food and non-alcoholic
beverages
Drafted in 2014, remains under development.
Tax on sugar sweetened beverages Introduced in 2019 at 11%, reduced from the originally proposed 20%
(supported by evidence indicating this higher rate would be more
effective).
Ban on marketing of infant formula Comprehensive policy adopted in 2012 but policy process significantly
delayed.
Ban on marketing of alcoholic beverages Currently under the Liquor Act of 2003 it is prohibited to advertise alcohol
targeting minors or to use false or misleading advertising [59]. A new
Control of Marketing of Alcoholic Beverages Bill drafted in 2013, includes
provisions to ban advertising, sports sponsorships and promotion of
alcoholic beverages [60] has not progressed.
Health warning labelling on alcoholic beverage containers In 2017 draft amendments to existing health warning labelling regulation
(2007) were published, increasing the size of warning labels and requiring
regular rotation of seven heath warning messages [61]. These
ammendments were later repealed in 2020.
Increasing the drinking age to 21, banning alcohol trade within 100 m
of schools and churches and liability clauses for alcohol retailers.
The draft Liquor amendment Bill of 2016 [62] containing these (among
other) regulations has undergone three revisions and remains under
consideration.
Controlling the production and sale of certain alcoholic products by
changing the alcohol content of what was deemed as liquor from 1%
of volume to 0.5% and to regulate the import and export of certain
alcoholic products.
The draft Liquor Products Amendment Bill 2016 [63] containing these
(among other) regulations has undergone three revisions and remains
under consideration.
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Thirty-three out of the 35 interviews were recorded.
Detailed notes were taken during the two unrecorded in-
terviews. All recorded interviews were later transcribed
in full. After each interview, the audio recordings or
notes were reviewed to inform necessary adaptations to
the interview guide and to identify the need for further
interviews.
Analysis
We analysed the data using thematic content analysis.
Codes were initially developed deductively, based on
the three forms of regulatory chill outlined previously.
Additional codes were developed inductively during
the analysis. Coding was conducted in NVivo (version
12.6.0) to ensure consistency and transparency in the
coding process. Coded extracts were then imported
into Word documents organized according to main
themes to identify patterns across key informant
interviews.
Results
Results are reported for each form of regulatory chill
(anticipatory, response and precedential) and compari-
sons are drawn between any identified chilling effect
generated by a perceived risk of an investor-state versus
a WTO state-state dispute. We also report identified
concessions on public health regulations made during
trade negotiations. Finally, conditions that may increase
the risk of, or protect against, regulatory chill are
described.
Anticipatory chill
Limited consideration of investor-state dispute risk during
nutrition and alcohol policymaking
While health policymakers in higher-level positions (and
with a broad understanding across NCD policy areas)
were aware of the specific risk of an investor-state dis-
pute in relation to tobacco control (given the recent
ISDS cases brought against Australia and Uruguay), this
awareness or perceived risk had generally not spilled-
over into nutrition and alcohol policymaking spaces.
Most policymakers exclusively involved in nutrition or
alcohol policymaking within the DoH were not specific-
ally aware of the risk of investor-state disputes and did
not differentiate between obligations within trade agree-
ments and BITs or different legal fora – WTO, inter-
national investment arbitration or domestic litigation.
Although aware of South Africa’s international invest-
ment obligations, one technical officer within the DoH
commented:
“It [the threat of an investment dispute] is not some-
thing that we have considered I must say, so it is difficult
to comment on. I am aware of the tobacco issues. But in
this case of alcohol, not at all. It’s not something that has
been on the table.” [DHA1].
Nutrition and alcohol advocates within CSOs and
NGOs broadly lacked awareness of South Africa’s inter-
national investment obligations and exposure to poten-
tial investor-state disputes.
However, various trade and health policymakers con-
firmed that all public health regulations were vetted by
state legal advisors to ensure compliance with South
Africa’s constitutional and international legal obligations,










Department of Health 17 7 1 3 10
Department. of Trade and Industry 14 0 2 6 7
National Treasury 4 1 0 1 2
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 6 2 0 0 2
Department of Social Development 1 0 1 0 1
Intergovernmental organisations, non-government organisations and civil society
organisations
8 4 2 0 6
Multinational food and alcohol corporations (originating both from within and
outside South Africa)
10 2 2 0 3
Academics 11 3 2 0 5
Health Attachés for South African Embassy in Geneva or Washington DC (current or
past)
6 0 0 0 0
Total 77 19 10 10 36
* The Cross-cutting category refers to stakeholders with experience or knowledge relevant to both nutrition and alcohol policy
(incidentally a number of them also have experience/knowledge relating to tobacco control)
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including under existing trade agreements and BITs.
One trade official commented, for example:
“there is an enormous amount of resources that go into
this … to say what are the trade effects? And then you’ve
got to make a judgment in terms of the agreements to say
yes you can do it for these reasons, but you have to do it
in the way that least restricts trade” [DTI3].
A nutrition policymaker within the DoH also stated:
“we make sure that whenever we come up with legisla-
tion, our lawyers will get that, and should there be any
sign of any possible disputes, they would have to advise
that this might impact in terms of trade [or investment
obligations].” [DHN1].
This suggests that despite limited awareness amongst
most but not all nutrition and alcohol policymakers,
there was some cursory awareness of investment-related
risk assessment being internalized in the policy develop-
ment process with the potential to generate a degree of
anticipatory chill.
Internalization of trade dispute risk in nutrition and alcohol
policymaking
In contrast to limited awareness of international invest-
ment obligations and risk of ISDS, health policymakers
were generally aware of the risk of generating ‘trade con-
cerns’ from trading partners and industry or potential
escalation to a formal WTO dispute if health policy was
not compliant with South Africa’s trade obligations. Pol-
icymakers described that compliance with WTO rules
had contributed to the internalization of a number of
principles during policymaking, particularly for trade-
sensitive regulations (e.g. nutrition and alcohol health
warning labelling). These included revising the regula-
tion to ensure it is as least trade restrictive as possible,
adopting a strict evidence-based approach to policy-
making and when local evidence was not available, en-
suring policies aligned with international standards or
guidelines. Following these principles were considered
by trade actors not to restrict regulatory space for nutri-
tion and alcohol harm reduction. One trade policymaker
explained, for example:
“If the DoH identifies the need for some kind of you
know labelling … it will be done because it’s been identi-
fied as a need and then that will be a scientifically
grounded decision … they will ask us what the implica-
tions are for trade and they will make sure that the way
that it’s carried out in a manner consistent with our obli-
gations. And if we are clear that its consistent with our
obligations … that it’s evidence-based … that it will be
applied to deal with the particular health problem then
we will be able to convince our principal and proceed”
[DTI02].
However, internalizing these principles in health policy
processes to comply with trade rules was reported by
health policymakers to limit the scope of policies and
policy design options available; delay the policy process;
and was burdensome on limited DoH resources. As
such, trade obligations generated a significantly greater
anticipatory-type chilling effect on nutrition and alcohol
regulation than South Africa’s investment obligations.
One DoH policymaker remarked for example:
“...we’ve now got to work harder in terms of how we’re
then going to defend, how we approach this because
whatever we put on the label, it can’t hinder any trade.”
[DHN2].
Alcohol and food labelling were particularly recog-
nised as potential technical barriers to trade and ensur-
ing these and any other trade-sensitive health
regulations were as least trade restrictive as possible was
internalized in policy development. Unacceptably high
costs of implementing a regulation for THCCs import-
ing into South Africa were particularly mentioned as a
technical barrier to trade. As such, minimizing the cost
to importers of a heath regulation during policy develop-
ment was considered important, particularly by trade
policy actors and was a potential driver of policy non-
decisions. For example, as one trade policymaker com-
mented when asked whether nutrition labelling would
be considered a technical barrier to trade:
“… it also depends on what the manufacturers, the cost
for them will be, and for trading partners and the manu-
facturers in other countries from where we import, what
their views are” [DTI1].
Trade obligations and concern to avoid triggering in-
formal trade challenges that may escalate to formal dis-
putes have contributed to the internalization of a strict
‘evidence-based’ approach to policymaking and was
identified as a key driver of anticipatory chill. Evidence
of the need for regulation (e.g. obesity or fetal alcohol
syndrome prevalence) and usually also of likely policy ef-
fectiveness, including specifically in the South African
context, was considered necessary which caused delays,
especially given limited DoH research funding. As one
DoH policymaker reflected:
“it’s delaying it [front-of-pack nutrition labelling policy
process] to the extent that those who've advocated for
this policy are saying ‘but you’re taking too long’ … but
we have to put in place the scientific evidence and all the
consumer acceptance … so that it can be defended if it
does come up as a trade dispute” [DHN2].
Another health stakeholder explained, making reference to
the Specific Trade Concerns raised six times by member
states at the WTO TBT Committee in relation to Thailand’s
proposed front-of-pack traffic-light nutrition label and 'chil-
dren should take less' warning on snack foods proposed in
2006 [60]:
“some of these international organisations they will say
that there is no robust evidence on the issue of food
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labelling legislation that we are proposing and if you go
ahead with that food labelling legislation then, like in
Thailand, you will be subjected to WTO agreements and
then you go through the WTO dispute resolution mechan-
ism” [H1].
Notably, Thailand’s nutrition labelling regulation was
not adopted until 2013 and with modifications that po-
tentially compromised its effectiveness [60].
In relation to South Africa’s proposed tobacco plain
packaging regulation, another health stakeholder
commented:
“when they [industry] are threatening, you also want to
make sure that you have enough evidence that could
stand in a court of law. So, for all those areas that they
started threatening we were able to go and search for
more in-depth and more convincing evidence so that by
the time they take us to court, we are ready because they
are already indicating that they will take us to court”
[H2].
While local evidence to support the need for and likely
effectiveness of a regulation was considered grounds to
safely diverge from international standards/guidelines,
limited DoH funding for research meant health policy-
makers were often forced to rely on international stan-
dards/guidelines to determine the policy agenda in order
to avoid trade challenges. As one DoH policymaker
commented:
“for us as a developing country, we don’t have the re-
sources to go about doing the science, so we often have to
rely on donors, international donors that can assist us to
develop this science whereas if it’s already in Codex or
it’s already in WHO, when it comes from a health policy
perspective, we can then say well, the policy narrative
comes from the WHO, therefore it’s something that we
need to look at.” [DHN3].
Without local research, the additional lack of guidance
from Codex on front-of-pack nutrition labelling had also
contribute to delayed progress on nutrition labelling.
Trade policymakers also commented on the import-
ance of adhering to international standards but that de-
viation from these standards was acceptable if
adequately robust evidence existed to support an alter-
native measure. One DTI policymaker reported:
“where there is an international standard in place you must
use that as a guide, and where there are situations in your coun-
try where the international standard won’t address your object-
ive for the regulation, you can deviate from the international
standard, but that should be evidence-based.” [DTI1].
A number of stakeholders mentioned that the obliga-
tion to notify WTO of any proposed regulation provided
foreign corporations with another channel, either dir-
ectly or through their home governments, to lobby and
prolong the policy process. However, this process was
broadly considered necessary and important to ensure
transparency and predictability in the policy environ-
ment despite being time and resource intensive. Health
policymakers also considered that spending sufficient
time consulting with international stakeholders was im-
portant to prevent THCCs taking legal action, as ex-
plained by one DoH policymaker:
“The legislation [nutrition labelling regulation] is still
in the consultation phase… we didn’t want to rush in in
terms of bringing in this legislation because we know the
impact it’s going to have … we didn’t want to … be taken
to court [by a company] saying that they were never con-
sulted. We wanted to avoid it. Hence, even our inter-
national counterparts, we sent it out to them and said
this is what South Africa’s going to come up with – do
you have any comments?” [DHN1].
Response chill
Trade officials reported that the South African govern-
ment had delayed progress on their proposed tobacco
plain packaging regulation by about two years until the
outcome of both Australia’s ISDS and WTO cases were
known, suggesting a degree of response chill had oc-
curred in the area of tobacco control. Adopting a ‘wait
and see’ approach was based on a reluctance to expend
resources on developing and implementing a regulation
they would later have to reverse if the same regulation
in another country was judged in arbitration to be in
violation of either international investment or WTO
rules. As one trade official explained:
“if you were watching a case under a bilateral invest-
ment treaty, and you went ahead and implemented that
same regulation and the case was found in favour of the
investor, then you could just see them lining up in South
Africa to proceed in the same way, so you’d have that
[chilling] effect but at the WTO the fact that this case
[involving Australia’s tobacco plain packaging regula-
tion] was going on, we didn’t know what the outcome
would be, so would you go ahead and implement it only
to have to reverse it afterwards because the award went
against the Australians? So yeah so it would have the
same [chilling] effect.” [DTI3].
Use of investment protection rules or threat of investor-
state dispute as a corporate tactic to generate nutrition or
alchol regulatory chill
There were no definitive cases reported by key infor-
mants of THCCs threatening to initiate an investor-state
dispute in an effort to generate a chilling effect on a spe-
cific nutrition or alcohol regulation in South Africa. Not-
ably, one alcohol industry representative denied that
they were even aware of the ISDS mechanism. Further,
senior trade officials within the DTI reflected that from
their perspective, avoiding a WTO dispute was of equal
concern as avoiding an investor-state dispute,
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particularly due to the very high perceived costs involved
with both.
Civil society representatives and academics perceived
that resorting to the use of ‘hard’ legal tactics has to date
been generally unnecessary for food and alcohol corpo-
rations. Instead, they are considered legitimate stake-
holders in the policymaking process and can effectively
apply ‘softer’ mechanism of power to expand access to
and influence within policymaking spaces. One academic
reflected for example:
“… they [THCCs] probably haven’t needed to do that
[use investor-state disputes] because they’re using other
approaches like embedding themselves with senior gov-
ernment officials” [RA2].
Another academic shared a similar view:
“they’re so close [government and the alcohol industry]
that they don’t need to bring in these threats of inter-
national trade agreements because they’ve got enough
power within the country to push policymakers.” [RA1].
While a number of CSO representatives and aca-
demics were concerned that the alcohol and food indus-
tries would, if necessary, use investment arbitration in
the future, preserving an amicable relationship with gov-
ernment was considered a key motivation for industry to
avoid, wherever possible, adopting such ‘hard’ tactics of
influence. For example, one health official commented:
“I think they try not to offend government [with legal
threats] and sometimes government doesn’t respond well
to threats. Sometimes they have their mind more on con-
vincing- to say look, if this goes ahead we’re going to have
to scale down our factory, and people are going to lose
jobs because our sale of sugar is going to decline” [TS1].
These views were supported by one alcohol industry
representative in relation to the proposed alcohol health
warning labelling which they argued was ambiguous and
contrary to other domestic law:
“[in relation to the] health warning regulations we had
to make a decision whether we would take the DoH to
court. And it was an incredibly difficult decision because
… they are regulators and you might win that battle but
lose the war ultimately … the decision that we took at
the time is:let’s continue finding ways to find some solu-
tions with the DoH but use our courts as a last resort”.
[AI1].
Use of trade rules/informal trade challenges to generate a
chilling effect on nutrition and alcohol policy
Respondents described a number of cases in which
South Africa’s trade obligations were used by either trad-
ing partners or THCCs to generate a chilling effect on
specific nutrition or alcohol regulations. The number of
examples described may well be underestimated since it
was acknowledged by some health policymakers that
pressure from trading partners for South Africa to
abandon certain regulations potentially occurred be-
tween high-level political actors within closed informal
political spaces.
Trading partners and THCCs had raised ‘trade con-
cerns’ and/or sought bilateral consultation in relation to
South Africa’s proposed front-of-pack nutrition labelling
of processed foods. For example, one DoH policymaker
reported having resisted attempts by other countries to
pressure South Africa into aligning their food labelling
regulations with other countries to minimize costs to
their companies importing into South Africa and to avoid
generating an unnecessary trade barrier.
While health policymakers denied that other countries’
proposed nutrition labelling being raised as a ‘specific
trade concern’ within the WTO’s TBT Committee had
delayed progress on South Africa’s own labelling regula-
tion, policymakers were assessing these cases as part of
their policy development process and proceeding
cautiously.
In relation to the tax on sugar-sweetened beverages in-
troduced in 2018, health policymakers reported that a
sugar-producing European country had attempted to
pressure South Africa into dropping the regulation
claiming that it would affect global sugar production and
was in violation of South Africa’s trade commitments.
However, one health actor commented "in the end the
trade side was also overridden by the health" [H3] and
the tax was introduced, although at just 11%, not the
originally proposed 20%.
It was also reported by nutrition policymakers that in-
dustry had argued the originally proposed Regulations
Relating to Foodstuffs for Infants and Young Chil-
dren banning marketing of breastmilk substitutes (even-
tually introduced in 2012), would create unnecessary
barriers to trade; that certain elements went beyond
what was recommended by Codex and the WHO’s
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substi-
tutes (e.g. including pacifiers/dummies); or did not have
sufficient supporting evidence (e.g. banning marketing of
complimentary foods). However, these threats did not
dissuade the DoH from adopting one of the most com-
prehensive set of regulations relating to the marketing of
infant formula globally and in line with WHO
guidelines.
In 2014 the DoH proposed amendments to their Regu-
lations Relating to Health Messages on Container Labels
of Alcoholic Beverages, increasing the size of the warn-
ings to one-eighth of the container and rotating each of
the seven warnings within every twelve-month period.
After notifying the WTO of the amendment, the regula-
tion was challenged informally at the TBT Committee
by the EU and Canada over concerns it would create
barriers to trade for small and medium producers [61].
Subsequently, the local alcohol industry as well as
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trading partners (including the EU and US) and for-
eign transnational alcohol corporations have bilaterally
engaged the DoH raising concerns about ambiguity of
the regulation; problem with the wording of the
health messages, accepting for example ‘don’t drink
and drive’ but not ‘alcohol may be a danger to your
health’; impracticality/technical feasibility of the pro-
posed size of the labels; the cost to manufacturers of
such frequent rotation of messages; and lack of suffi-
cient evidence of the regulation’s effectiveness in re-
ducing alcohol-related harm. It was mentioned by a
few health policymakers that transnational alcohol
companies had complained that, for a number of the
reasons outlined, the labelling requirements would
create unnecessary barriers to trade.
Ultimately however, despite a reported earlier consen-
sus between the DoH and DTI in favour of amending
the alcohol health warning labelling regulation, in Octo-
ber 2020, the DoH repealed the proposed amendments
due to the challenges of implementing the regulation
raised by local industry (e.g., the difficulty in calculating
one-eight of the surface area on an alcohol container)
and potentially also international stakeholders' concern
that the regulation created unnecessary barriers to trade.
The DoH planned to review the regulation in light of in-
formal discussions with the WHO and their discussion
paper on policy options for alcohol labelling. This
process indicates the requirement for very specific inter-
national guidance on the design, size and content of
health warning labels based on scientific evidence.
When asked more generally about the use of trade
rules as a strategy to influence South Africa’s regulatory
environment, one alcohol industry representative
reflected:
“...it’s a long, drawn-out process, even as a business. We
would never go to a government and say that this govern-
ment is in contravention of the WTO, without being a
hundred percent certain.” [AI2].
Another foreign transnational alcohol corporation rep-
resentative commented that while “using international
trade rules to limit policy” [IA2] had been considered by
the alcohol industry, it was in fact very difficult to
achieve.
There was however indication that the alcohol indus-
try attempted to enlist the South African government to
act on their behalf at the WTO in an effort to chill pol-
icy progress in South Africa’s trading partner countries.
This was explained by a trade official:
“Industries will come and they’ll make a case and
they’ll go through NEDLAC and they’ll write to the min-
isters, they’ll write to the president, they’ll speak to all of
the officials and they try to make their case [for filing a
WTO complaint against a trading partner] and then
you’d have to make an assessment of whether or not the
case is legitimate, whether or not you have a chance of
winning the case.” [DTI3].
An alcohol industry representative commented how-
ever, that their industry did not contribute enough to
GDP to be in a position to convince the SA government
to act on their behalf within WTO fora. Instead the alco-
hol industry was able to utilise its global business net-
work through, for example the World Wine Trade
Group that includes wine producers and distributers in
the US, Canada, Chile, Australia, New Zealand, Uruguay,
Argentina and Georgia. For example, in relation to Scot-
land’s proposed minimum unit pricing regulation an al-
cohol industry representative commented:
“we asked our counterparts in those countries to please
speak to their governments. And again, you speak to the
ones who are most likely to help. And you know the US
government was willing to listen to its industry and raise
concerns”.
Together these findings again indicate that South Afri-
ca’s trade obligations are currently a much more relevant
tool of influence to promote nutrition and alcohol policy
non-decisions than any problem of response chill result-
ing from threats of investment arbitration.
Precedential chill
Given that no previous WTO or investor-state disputes
have been in relation to a specific nutrition or alcohol
harm reduction regulation in South Africa or elsewhere,
no cases of precedential chill in these policy areas were
identified. However again, trade officials reported South
African government’s confidence to proceed with their
tobacco plain packaging proposal was significantly
boosted by the positive outcomes in Australia’s investor-
state dispute despite the lack of precedent in inter-
national investment case law. This suggests that had the
opposite outcome been reached in this case, precedential
chill may have occurred for tobacco plain packaging in
South Africa.
The outcome of the WTO dispute against Australia
was however reported by both trade and health actors to
have equally influenced South Africa’s decision to
proceed with implementing their own regulation. One
trade official explained this was due to an understanding
that once precedents are established in WTO case law,
they usually hold in future cases. Therefore it may have
been considered too risky for South Africa to proceed
with plain packaging if Australia has lost their case:
“if it had gone against Australia perhaps there would
have been a re-evaluation [of the policy in South Africa]
and to then take into account the risks of another chal-
lenge to us and you know once the precedent is set, then
it’s very difficult to win the case after that, so the risk of
being challenged successfully would have gone up and so
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… we would have to make an assessment whether not it
was worth taking that risk.” [DTI3].
Concessions on public health regulations during trade
negotiations
In addition to concerns of post-agreement trade rule vi-
olations, trade policymakers described the potential for
health policy non-decisions to be promoted during trade
agreement negotiations.
There was concern amongst high-level trade officials
that international trade rules, particularly those outside
the WTO systems, so-called ‘WTO-plus’ or ‘WTO-extra’
commitments, had the potential to restrict domestic
public policy space for addressing development chal-
lenges. As such South Africa generally tried to negotiate
agreements within the WTO framework. As one trade
official explained:
“we still sit with huge unemployment and rural under-
development... So you want to address both issues, you
don’t want to be tied up in agreements that prevent you
from doing certain actions that are in the public’s inter-
est.” [DTI3].
However, it was fairly widely perceived that, as a devel-
oping country, South Africa was often required to make
concessions during trade negotiations with larger more
powerful economies, including further opening their
markets for processed foods products and alcohol. As
one alcohol industry representative stated:
“they [the DTI] don’t start looking at alcohol policy
and say well you know, should we be allowing alcohol to
come in duty free? It’s the powers of negotiators at a
trade block level that will determine the outcome” [AI1].
In 2015 the US was reported to have threatened to cut
access of approximately 6000 South African products,
including wine, to the US market under the African
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) Agreement if
South Africa did not lift an anti-dumping duty and other
trade barriers to imported US chicken products. Ultim-
ately, South Africa agreed to reduce barriers to US
chicken imports which also required relaxing poultry
food and safety standards that some suggested had po-
tential direct public health impacts. Others mentioned
the indirect public health impacts relating to the devas-
tating economic impact on local poultry farmers who
could not compete with the high volume of cheap
imported US chicken cuts. There was however a general
perception that, ultimately, the economic benefits out-
weighed the health impacts, as one health stakeholder
explained:
“[we] looked at the cost and benefits ultimately and we
then realised that, in the long run, it will be in our best
interest to relax some of the health and safety regulations
for a bigger agenda or for a bigger good.” [H1].
Conditions that influence regulatory chill or trade-related
policy non-decisions
Both trade and health policymakers discussed various
conditions that may directly or indirectly increase the
likelihood of, or protect against trade or investment
dispute-related regulatory chill.
Perceptions of trade and investment rules and dispute
settlement systems
The first set of conditions relates to perceptions of the
international trade and investment rules and dispute
settlement systems themselves, however these were pri-
marily discussed in general terms, not in relation to spe-
cific cases of nutrition or alcohol regulatory chill. While
some trade policymakers were confident that existing
safeguards within the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agree-
ment (SPS) and TBT Agreement provided sufficient pro-
tection for nutrition and alcohol harm reduction
regulation, another high-level trade official was con-
cerned that WTO agreements “were not entirely bal-
anced” and tended to prioritize trade over health
objectives. However, this comment was made in relation
to TRIPS and access to medicines, not nutrition or alco-
hol regulation. The same trade official also reflected that
the WTO dispute settlement system was structured in a
way that prioritized trade over health:
“it’s quite tenuous in a sense that these serious health
considerations would be subject to a decision by panel-
lists that have in their mind the trade implications over-
whelmingly... you get a chance of a bias in the WTO
towards trade … they’re highly competent people but this
[health] is not their field.” [DTI3].
However, another trade policymaker felt that over
time, WTO norms had shifted such that expert input
from the WHO was increasingly sought and considered
during health-relevant arbitration.
Generally though, the WTO as opposed to the
investor-state dispute system was still perceived as a pre-
ferred option, partly since it had been agreed on by all
WTO member states and provides a buffer against weak
claims by industry:
“the WTO mechanism is seen to be a better option, it’s
also not … private companies that challenge govern-
ments, its [other] states. They [private corporations] have
to convince their government to take up the challenge in
order to launch it … so there’s an advantage” [DTI3].
Trade policymakers recognized a number of character-
istics of the ISDS system which may increase the risk of
regulatory chill which, not surprisingly, aligned with the
findings of the 2010 Review of South Africa’s BITs.
These included a lack of perceived legitimacy of the
ISDS process since cases are brought by private corpora-
tions against a government and the outcome decided by
three private arbitrators; a lack of precedent and
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consistency in arbitral decisions; conflict of interest of
arbitrators and lawyers; and cost of arbitration itself as
well as potential investor compensation.
While in theory these concerns meant the threat of an
investor-state dispute may generate greater uncertainty
and concern than the threat of a WTO dispute, in prac-
tice, the perceived high costs associated with either
could potentially have a chilling effect on health policy.
One trade official reported for example:
“ … the costs become a really important consideration.
And the longer they go on the more costly that becomes
and many developing countries simply don’t have the fi-
nances to pursue these cases … even when they would
want to … and may accede to the demands of the claim-
ants more easily than a developed country that … is pre-
pared to fight the case with the best available lawyers
over a period of time” [DTI3].
The cost of trade sanctions imposed by a trading part-
ner in response to an identified or perceived violation of
South Africa’s trade obligations was also noted to be a
major consideration.
Country-related characteristics
Stakeholders within the DTI also identified a number of
country-related characteristics, largely determined by a
state’s level of economic development, that may increase
the likelihood of regulatory chill in South Africa and
other LMIC countries. Limited institutional capacity for
analysing trade and investment treaty texts (as had pre-
viously occurred in South Africa) and their ongoing sta-
tus as primarily a ‘rule-taker’ in treaty negotiations with
larger economies were considered by trade policymakers
to potentially make it difficult to protect policy space to
regulate in the public interest. Lack of technical capacity
and human resources was also reported to make it chal-
lenging for South Africa to engage in trade negotia-
tions or, monitor and assess new regulations and
procedures within the multiple WTO fora. This was
thought to potentially make South Africa more vulner-
able to non-compliance with newer WTO regulations,
exposing them to potential trade-related complaints or
disputes. Limited trade literacy within the DoH (outside
access to medicines issues) and minimal collaboration
and coordination between trade and health policymakers
on trade policy development or negotiations was also
identified as having potential to reduce nutrition and al-
cohol policy space.
Industry-related characteristics
Industry-related factors include the social acceptability
of the industry being regulated with indication that a
high level of industry unacceptability can be protective
against regulatory chill. For example, in contrast to the
food and alcohol industry, trade actors reflected on the
social unacceptability of the tobacco industry and its
products and how this motivated the government to
proceed with plain packaging despite the ongoing recog-
nized risk of a trade or investment dispute.
High levels of social unacceptability of the relevant in-
dustry also appeared to diminish the applicability of ra-
tionale used by trade actors to explain policy non-
decisions. For example, while both trade and health pol-
icymakers identified insufficient evidence as a key driver
of nutrition policy non-decisions (partly since this ex-
posed South Africa to a trade or investment challenge),
lack of evidence of policy effectiveness was not consid-
ered a reason to shelve the proposed tobacco plain pack-
aging regulation. As one trade policymaker explained:
“you can only determine what will be the effect after it
has been introduced. So it’s very difficult to anticipate be-
forehand what the results will be. But from our point of
view we don’t really see a negative effect [of adopting
plain packaging].” [DTI1].
A product’s perceived risk to health could also influ-
ence the willingness of policymakers to pursue a regula-
tion despite the trade or investment-related legal risks.
While strong evidence of a causal relationship between a
product and one or more deleterious health outcomes
was essential, the health risk of a product appeared also
to be assessed on the basis of the complexity of such a
causal relationship. For example, one trade policymaker
explained the evidence of the risk to health of sugary
foods was not considered sufficient to warrant restricting
trade.
This was reflected on by one health policy actor as
contrasting with South Africa’s willingness to introduce
the South African Medicines Act in 1997 despite legal
threats that these policies were in violation of TRIPS.
This was considered due to how clear and direct the im-
plications of TRIPS was for access to affordable medi-
cines during the AIDS epidemic and the associated scale
of AIDS mortality at that time in South Africa. These
issue characteristics, along with massive civil society
pressure, were cited by policymakers as the key reason
government adopted amendments to the Medicines and
Related Substance Control Act despite threats of US
trade sanctions, a WTO dispute and a domestic legal
case brought by multinational pharmaceutical companies
including for violations of TRIPs.
Cross-border learning
The capacity for cross-border policy learning also ap-
peared to build policymaker confidence in developing
regulations that would withstand any trade (or possibly
investment) challenge. Health policymakers reported
reviewing measures other countries have taken and suc-
cessfully defended in WTO fora, including the evidence
used and policy design. As, for example, one DoH
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policymaker commented in relation to front-of-pack nu-
trition labelling:
“we’re actually looking in terms of what other countries
have done and what the challenges might be, we’re in-
volving the legal minds to help come up with something
like this, so that we wouldn’t have any trade disputes or
any challenges with the WTO” [DHN1].
Lastly, political will, policy champions and the strength
of civil society action were mentioned as important to
protect against regulatory chill.
Discussion
This research sought to investigate if, why and in what
form regulatory chill may be occurring in an LMIC
country context. Aligned with both previous empirical
studies [35, 36], we found a low level of awareness of
South Africa’s BIT obligations and the potential threat
of an ISDS challenge amongst nutrition and alcohol pol-
icymakers and an outsourcing of legal vetting of public
health regulations for BIT compliance. While this indi-
cates the potential for investment dispute-related antici-
patory chill, we found no definitive evidence of such.
However, WTO obligations and the perceived risk of a
state-state dispute had contributed to policymakers in-
ternalizing a relatively strict evidence-based policy-
making approach, general adherence to international
standards/guidelines (particularly when local evidence is
not available) and a focus on designing regulations to be
as least trade restrictive as possible, which together con-
tributed to delayed policy adoption. These findings point
to a number of potential strategies to reduce the risk of
nutrition and/or alcohol policy chill/non-decisions in
South Africa but potentially also other LMICs, although
generalizability of our findings are discussed in more de-
tail at the end of this section.
Approaches that may reduce the ‘anticipatory’ burden
on health policymaking include, at the international-
level, resolving the uncertainty regarding evidential re-
quirements to prove the necessity of a health measure in
WTO fora and confirming the acceptability of measures
based on existing science or scientific logic in the ab-
sence of indisputable evidence of policy effectiveness. Es-
tablishing robust mechanisms to manage conflicts of
interest within international standard and guideline-
setting bodies and fora, including Codex and the WHO
will also be critical to reducing industry influence in the
standards and guidelines used to shape national policy
agendas and protect against trade challenges.
At the national level, increased funding for independ-
ent nutrition and alcohol policy research should be a
priority. Building capacity within both departments/min-
istries of health and trade to understand the implications
of trade and investment obligations on nutrition and al-
cohol policy development and establishing new and/or
utilizing existing co-ordination mechanisms between de-
partments, to promote health policy expert engagement
in trade and investment policy and agreement negotia-
tions will also be important. This may help ensure public
health policy space is protected in future agreements, for
example by advocating for reducing the burden on
health policymakers to prove regulatory effectiveness a
priori, instead accepting post-adoption policy evaluation.
In South Africa for example a number of mechanisms to
promote policy co-ordination across sectors are already
well established including the Forum of South African
Directors-General cluster system within government and
the National Economic Development and Labour Coun-
cil in which government comes together with business,
labour and community groups to discuss and try to
reach consensus on issues of social and economic policy.
It may be possible to utilize these structures to improve
trade and health policy co-ordination. New inter-
ministerial co-ordination structures have also recently
been established in South Africa which have improved
co-ordination on the specific trade and health issue of
intellectual property (e.g., the Inter-Ministerial Commit-
tee on Intellectual Property). However, structural change
alone is insufficient, improving co-ordination and policy
cohesion very much depends on each government’s
overarching values, interests and priorities in spaces
where health issues and wider foreign policy matters
converge. Further, co-ordination efforts will only be ef-
fective if replicated at the regional (e.g. in SADC model
BIT) and international level (e.g. in WTO agreements).
To support such action public health advocacy organi-
zations must become more attuned to the effects of
trade agreements on nutrition and alcohol regulatory
progress and find ways to distil the complexity of link-
ages down into simple terms that effectively communi-
cate the implications for the food and alcohol products
available in people’s everyday lives their food and alcohol
'environments') [7, 62], which shape food options and
drinking decisions. For example, simple messaging of
the direct impact of trade agreements on the cost of
medicines and people’s health as well as the use of hu-
man rights framings proved highly effective in building
public support and driving political action to protect ac-
cess to affordable medicines in South Africa despite
threats of trade sanctions, an international trade dispute
and domestic litigation.
No clear evidence was identified that THCCs have
resorted to threatening South Africa directly with an
investor-state dispute in relation to nutrition or alcohol
regulations. Rather THCCs tend to seek to protect their
status as legitimate stakeholders in policymaking pro-
cesses and instead use a range of ‘softer’ strategies to in-
fluence policy decisions. However, the tobacco plain
packaging case provides evidence that by initiating
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investment litigation against one country, THCCs can
generate cross-border response chill, delaying the same
regulatory development process in others. This case also
suggests that precedential chill may well occur if invest-
ment arbitrators rule against a public health regulation.
These findings support concerns that a single investor-
state dispute can potentially shift decision-making power
(at least temporarily) from the state to a private tribunal,
not only in the litigating country, but also, in other
countries globally [14, 63]. These findings should
incentivize LMICs to continue or start taking steps to
protect public health policy space within future BITs
(e.g. by complete carve-outs of regulations designed to
protect public health [64]) and by eliminating their ex-
posure to ISDS, particularly given the limited evidence
that investment protection provisions within BITs pro-
mote foreign investment [65, 66]. Brazil, for example,
has entered into a number of Co-operation and Facilita-
tion Investment Agreements that exclude ISDS [67]. Re-
gionally, consideration of investment protection
frameworks that mitigate the risks of earlier investment
treaties and establish a more appropriate balance be-
tween investor protection and the rights of government
to regulate in the public interest may be useful. Given
many LMICs’ ongoing exposure to ISDS, increasing pub-
lic health policymaker knowledge of BIT legal obliga-
tions and relevant dispute decisions in a balanced
manner such that they can recognize future potential
spurious threats and maximize existing policy space,
may also be useful.
Trade-related concerns raised by trading partners and
industry appear to occur much more frequently than
threats of BIT non-compliance in South Africa and have
the potential to generate regulatory chill. Down-stream
post-treaty adoption strategies to build health policy-
maker confidence against claims of trade agreement vio-
lations may include strengthening mechanisms for
policy learning across borders and improved inter-
departmental trade and health capacity and coordin-
ation, as has been found in Thailand [68]. Alleviating the
potentially prohibitive cost for LMICs of defending a
health measure in a WTO dispute may also be import-
ant to reduce any cost-related drivers of regulatory chill.
Requiring public health experts to sit on WTO arbitra-
tion panels residing over cases of public health relevance
may be a way to decrease the real if not perceived bias
of dispute panels.
Diminishing social acceptability of an industry and its
product may help shift political priority from avoiding a
trade or investment challenge towards a more proactive
regulatory approach. Strategies to achieve this include
clear communication of a product’s negative impacts on
public health; exposure of nefarious industry tactics to
promote unhealthy consumption of these products; and
use of framing. For example, the industry ‘demonization’
frame has been effective in building public support for
regulating the marketing of ‘junk food’ to children in
Australia [69] and has widely been applied to promote
tobacco control. A ‘systems’ framing for complex public
health challenges like obesity that effectively shifts re-
sponsibility from the individual to higher level system
actors including industry and government has also been
effective in generating political priority for obesity pre-
vention in Australia [69].
Finally, careful consideration must be taken before
generalizing the key findings described in this single case
study to other LMIC settings. Notably, South African
trade policymakers may have a heightened awareness of
the potential risk of investor-state disputes compared to
policymakers in many other LMICs (and especially those
engaged in very few trade and/or investment agree-
ments) given South Africa’s previous exposure to
investor-state disputes, understanding of the risk to
democratic public policymaking posed by the ISDS
mechanism (as outlined in its 2010 BIT review), and
their ongoing exposure to ISDS under 12 remaining
BITs, and under ‘survival’ clauses of terminated agree-
ments. However, while tobacco regulators also recog-
nized this risk, it was not shared by nutrition and
alcohol policymakers, which we anticipate may well also
be the case in many other countries. As such, findings of
very limited investment-dispute related anticipatory chill
on nutrition and alcohol regulation in South Africa, may
well be similar elsewhere.
We also found South Africa’s previous experience of being
threatened with domestic legal action and an international
trade dispute over claimed TRIPS violations by its 1997
Medicines Act, may have increased South African policy-
makers’ level of awareness of trade obligations and dispute
risk as compared to health policymakers in LMICs without
similar previous experiences. As such, the anticipatory chill
of NCD prevention policies to avoid a trade dispute we iden-
tified in South Africa may vary in prominence in other
LMICs, depending on their trade commitments, previous ex-
perience with informal trade challenges or formal WTO dis-
putes and the specific health policy area.
Direct threats of an investment or trade dispute chal-
lenging NCD prevention policies in LMICs with even
more limited financial, legal and administrative re-
sources and/or lower prioritization of NCDs and weaker
public health policy norms than South Africa, may make
other LMICs more vulnerable to response chill than we
found in our case study.
Overall however, despite the variable degrees of regu-
latory chill likely to be occurring in different countries
and in different NCD policy areas, we suggest that the
ongoing and deepening commitment to trade and in-
vestment obligations in many countries, and the
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potential for corporations to use these to threaten costly
trade or investment disputes, make the recommenda-
tions in this paper widely applicable.
Limitations
In addition to generalizability considerations, there are
two other key limitations in our analysis. Firstly, we
interviewed significantly fewer higher-level trade and
health political actors than those leading policy develop-
ment at the technical level. This may have meant certain
relevant high-level negotiations, deal-brokering or cases
of trade or investment dispute-related regulatory chill
were not captured in this analysis. Secondly, the analysis
may be limited due to nondisclosure of relevant infor-
mation by interviewed stakeholders due to the powerful
interests involved and political nature of the topics
covered.
Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge this research contributes
the first case study investigating trade and investment
dispute-related public health regulatory chill in an LMIC
country context. Our findings indicate that, at the time
of our study, South Africa’s trade obligations had a more
prominent role in nutrition and alcohol regulatory chill
than BIT-related concerns. However, given the potential
for wider use of the ISDS mechanism by THCCs in the
future, strategies to protect public health policy space in
the context of both international trade and investment
treaty and dispute settlement contexts will be important.
This work highlights the need for further research exam-
ining strategies used by governments to withstand BIT
and trade-related legal threats by industry (or trading
partners) and how greater protection of health policy
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